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Abstract 
 
Through the past decades, it is observed an expansion between the relationship of 
internal audit department, internal control and audit committees. This phenomenon 
is happening because of the huge financial scandals and failures that took place the 
late 2000’s. This dissertation is written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, 
Auditing and Financial Management of the International Hellenic University. 
This paper has a purpose of examining the impact of the audit committee proxies 
(Independence and size) on the financial reporting quality as long as there is internal 
audit function within the firm. The financial reporting quality of a company is related 
with the internal corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee and 
internal audit function. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis over 
392 non-financial firms listed in S&P500, for the last 5 years (2013-2017). In our 
analysis we used data from the companies’ financial reports as well as audit related 
databases. OLS is used to regress the financial reporting quality variables on audit 
committee and internal audit function. 
In the last years, it is required from the law for a firm, to have an auditor to insure the 
financial reports as well as the corporate governance environment. So, after the 
requirement of this law, the most companies decided to comply with it by improving 
the existence of the Audit Committee and the internal audit function. This means that 
the Audit Committee members started to meet more frequently and gain financial 
expertise. So, we can safely assume that an audit committee that get together for 
often have better results regarding financial reporting issues. It also gives the 
opportunity for further discussion and problems solution in the financial statements. 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that is significant relationship between audit 
committee and financial reporting quality. Previous studies also showed that some of 
the corporate government mechanisms affect the financial reporting quality. So, this 
thesis contributes to the past literature review as we examine a big sample from the 
S&P500 that to the extent of my knowledge has not been done before. 
Keywords: Internal Audit, Financial Reporting Quality, Audit Committees, S&P500 
Delandreas Ioannis 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the dramatic financial scandals of the last decade, the regulators 
concentrate on audit and corporate governance topics. New laws and regulations help 
to achieve the best possible financial reporting quality. This leads to the increase of 
interest of the shareholders to continue investing and believe in a firm’s successful 
reign through the years. The internal audit department is a big source that helps the 
audit committee by providing information, analysis and assurance. One of the major 
roles of internal audit is to concentrate on different type or risks, such as different 
types of risk and of course provide assurance for the audit committee on relevant 
information of these risks. The reported question of this dissertation is of paramount 
importance, because we want to exam if the audit committee has effect on the 
financial reporting quality of the company in accordance with the internal audit 
function. This thesis, exams a sample from S&P500 non-financial listed firms, that has 
not been researched before. 
 
1.1. Frauds in the past 
 
During the past decades, a lot of frauds came into the surface of the financial 
environment, leading the companies to be more conservative and careful with their 
financial statements. Some of the biggest scandals are referred below: 
1. Waste Management Scandal (1998) – It was a public company of Houston that 
is active on the waste management sector. The company showed $1.7bn in fake 
earnings. They decided to increase the depreciation period for their assets on the 
balance sheets. This fraud was revealed when a new CEO and his team went 
analytically through the books. 
 
2. Enron Scandal (2001) – This company was based in Houston and was a 
commodities energy and service corporation. From this scandal, many employees lost 
their jobs, hundreds of investors lost their accounts. Moreover, the shareholders lost 
almost $74bn, a huge amount and the company held huge debts off the balance 
sheets for consecutive years. There were suspicions about high-stock prices and 
turned in by internal whistle-blower Sherron Watkins. 
 
3. WorldCom Scandal (2002) – The company was a big one in the 
telecommunications sector that now is called MCI Inc. They inflated assets by $11bn 
and lead to $180bn losses for investors and over 30,000 lost jobs. The line costs were 
usually underreported because the chose to capitalize and not to expend. Overall, the 
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company inflated revenues with fake accounting entries, and they were busted when 
the Internal Audit Department announcing $3.8bn of fraud. 
 
 
4. Tyco Scandal (2002) – This company was based in New Jersey and was a 
security systems company. The Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of 
the company stole $150 million and inflated company’s income by $500 million. 
Manhattan D.A investigations in accordance with SEC found questionable accounting 
practices such as large loans that was given to Kozlowski that were then forgiven. 
 
5. Lehman Brothers Scandal (2008) – This was a global financial company that 
was a leader. They hid over $50 bn in loans and showed as sales. They chose to sell 
toxic assets in banks knowing that they would be re-boughted soon. So, they created 
the impression that Lehman had $50bn more cash and $50bn less in assets than it 
already had. This huge fraud was revealed when the firm went bankrupt and changed 
the global economy. 
 
 
6. Bernie Madoff Scandal (2008) – It was an Investment firm founded by Madoff. 
They made the bigger Ponzi scheme ever and tricked the investors out of more than 
$64.8 bn. Investors were paid returns out for their own money than profits. The fraud 
came in sight when Madoff told his sons about this scheme and they chose to report 
him to SEC. 
All these cases that referred above, leaded the companies to apply more strict 
corporate mechanisms to control their financial statements. So, the companies gave 
importance to their Audit Committees and their characteristics, the internal audit 
function and of course their accounting departments. 
Auditing is a continuous and independent examination of data, financial 
statements, records and performances of the companies. As soon as companies 
applied the internal audit department, they managed to reduce any risks of financial 
reporting quality corruption. In any case, the internal audit function recognizes any 
possible misstatements and communicates with the shareholders of a company 
throughout the audit report. 
Through a study of Allegrini M. et al (2008), it is stated that “internal audit” is a 
quite new profession in Europe with 57% of the internal audit departments existing 
less than ten years. Having an Internal Function within a company consists a valuable 
asset in order for the risks to mitigate. 
Moreover, the existence of an Audit Committee gives the opportunity to a 
company to review its internal controls. The audit committee usually monitors the 
effectiveness of internal audit function. It also ensures that the internal audit 
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department works independently and objectively without the influence of those being 
audited. 
The internal audit department of a company should be well informed about 
several issues of the company and be granted with access to useful information by the 
Audit Committee. Internal Auditors are obligated to follow some professional 
standards when following their procedures. The audit committee should also arrange 
the meetings with the Head of Internal Audit and this position should play a direct role 
in decisions concerning the Head of Internal Audit’s appraisal and remuneration. 
1.2. S&P 500 
 
In the last years, the Standard & Poor’s 500 index is the most commonly used in 
order to determine the state of the economy in general. In fact, many investors prefer 
to use this index instead of others. The Dow Jones Industrial Average in the past used 
to be the best of economic health of the United States of America. Hence, there were 
only 30 companies listed and there were limitations in the included sectors.  
Despite the broader scope of S&P500, another advantage is that it gives a potential 
investor the chance to check the updates of the components quarterly. Which 
companies can be included to the market is decided by a special committee. The 
factors considered by this special committee are market capitalization in the US, 
adequate liquidity and financial viability. Companies must have trade action for at 
least six to twelve months after their initial public offering (IPOs) before being 
considered for inclusion in the index.   
The S&P500 had to be consistent over time and in order for this goal to be 
achieved, it was adjusted corporate actions that could affect market capitalization, 
such as dividends, mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs. Throughout the years the 
S&P’s components were different in order to remain an accurate indicator of the US 
economy. 
Hence, we concluded in using S&P500 Index in order to build our sample, because 
it is the most indicative of the US economy, it updates the components quarterly and 
is the most accurate stock market at the time. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to adjust the effect of internal audit function 
and audit committee in financial reporting quality. The audit committee should be 
able to ensure the efficiency of internal auditors and be accurate to it’s responsibilities 
by providing transparency. Moreover, an extremely useful tool for the audit 
committee to monitor any organizational risks and assess internal procedures is, the 
internal audit function.  
So, the relationship between internal audit function and audit committee comes 
as a result of the continues discussion and resolving possible problems and findings in 
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the financial statements. With this way, the corporate governance mechanisms are 
usually enhanced. 
The role of internal audit function and audit committee in financial reporting 
quality will be tested by using a sample of 392 non-financial firms listed in S&P 500, 
between 2013 and 2017.  The results of this study suggest that a company’s financial 
reporting quality is affected in a positive way by the audit committee independence. 
Furthermore, it will be discussed the literature review on audit committees and 
internal audits and is followed by our hypotheses. Then we present the methodology, 
before findings and results. Finally, we draw some conclusions, discusses implications 
from the results. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Agency Theory 
 
The association between principals and agents in business is explained by the 
assumption called agency theory. This theory is developed from Kathleen M. 
Eisenhardt in 1989 and is focused in the solution of problems that may happen in 
agency relationships for different goals or different levels of risk. In finance the most 
usual agency relationship occurs between shareholders and company executives. 
Many problems occur from the principal-agent relationship, such as different goals or 
desires and agency theory should resolve these issues. Usually, this situation takes 
place when the agent does not inform the principal about his actions or because is 
prohibited by resources from acquiring the information. Sometimes though, company 
executive wish to expand the business to several markets. According to Shapiro in 
2005 this means, that they will sacrifice the short-term profitability, for a perspective 
of higher and better results in profitability. However, shareholders that desire high 
current capital growth may be unaware of the executive plans (Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & 
Balkin, D. B. 1992). 
Another task, that the agency theory deals with is the different level of risk 
between a shareholder and a manager. Sometimes, an agent makes use of the 
principal’s resources. Therefore, although the agent is the decides, they are incurring 
little to no risk at all, because all losses will be the burden of the principal. This usually 
happens when the shareholders of a company decide to contribute financial support 
to the company and the executives take advantage of this and use the money for their 
own reasons. The agent may tolerate the risk differently than the shareholder because 
of the different distribution of risk. 
Generally, the association between two parties, a principal and an agent that 
represents the principal in third-party transactions, is referred as agency. 
Relationships happen when shareholders (principals) allow the agents (executives) to 
act on their behalf. 
Agency theory (Greenwood, R. 2003) describes different situations in which one 
party acts on behalf of the other. Financial Institutions have the obligation to generate 
shareholders’ wealth. However, the practices of a business help to incur risk by loans. 
Some of these loans are outsourced for shareholders. 
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2.2. Agency theory in relation with Audit Committee 
 
 The agency theory assumes that an inborn moral hazard in principal-agent 
relations, raise the agency costs (Adams, M. B. 1994). For example, agents can take 
into consideration the accounting procedures to show the best results and make their 
own wealth, by taking higher compensation packages or bonuses. Audit Committee 
should resolver problems as the one above. An effective audit committee can increase 
the quality and credibility of annual audited financial statements. Previous studies 
focused on problems that are associated to the formation, composition and the 
benefits of audit committees. Pincus et al. (1989) and Bradbury (1990), stated that 
there is a relationship between characteristics and the formation of audit committees 
in the US and New Zealand, respectively. The results though, of the studies above were 
totally different. Pincus et. al (1989) found relationship between ownership patterns, 
audit committees and between Big auditors and audit committees, but Bradbury 
(1990) did not.  
Moreover, Deli and Gilan (2000) found that chance of a firm to have completely 
independent audit committee is negatively related with the growth opportunities of 
the firm. Some studies were made also in other countries such as Australia (Carson, 
2002) and Great Britain (Collier, 1993).  Carson stated that in Australia it is more usual 
the existence of an Audit Committee if a firm is large and has a Big-5 auditor.  
Below are presented some factors that an audit committee should be formed to 
alleviate the agency cost: 
1. Companies report audited financial statements to help mitigating the agency 
costs that are arise from the separation of shareholders and managers. So, we can 
assume that a company’s high agency costs are created by the separation of 
ownership and control. They then, decide to create an audit committee to add 
credibility to financial statements.  
 
2. Blockholders that are outside of the company may own a crucial number of 
shares in the firm, but they are not shown in the board of directors. Hence, they are 
not correlated with the shareholders or the directors. They want to check the 
company more deeply, but they rely heavily on the annual reports for information. 
Though, because the annual reports are produced internally and is not so integrate.  
 
3. The outside non-executive members of a company have two valuable 
characteristics to check on the company procedures. The first one is their expertise 
they offer and the second their independence.  
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4. Big 8 CPA firms offer higher level of audit quality than smaller CPA firms. That 
happens because the Big 8, have such technological growth that leads to the 
recognition of more material mistakes in clients’ financial statements. This study is 
from Francis and Wilson (1988) and with some other studies argue that if a company 
is audited by a Big 8 firm will have less information asymmetry and if there is less 
asymmetry there is also smaller demand to monitor procedures. 
 
5. According to Smith and Warner (1979) and Chow (1982) the agency costs of 
debt are created from the conflicts of interest between managers that hold the debt. 
Here, the managers may act in order to divert resources away from the debt holders 
(e.g. High-Risk Projects). Audit Committee plays an important role in order to avoid 
these wealth transfers and also mitigate agency problems. This committee can also 
replace many disadvantages of a company which causes agency problem.  
In many cases an agency conflict happens between managers and shareholders. 
Then the audit committee plays an important role in mitigating this conflict, according 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976). Previous findings and laws have tested the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in the mechanisms of corporate governance 
(DeZoort, Hermansson, & Houston, 2003). The Blue-Ribbon Committee (BRC,1999), 
recommends the audit committee members to be independent, financially literate 
andacceptable size. Abbott et.al (2004) states that the recommendations above show 
a very well-organized match of top practices that is expected to give more effective 
results in the process of financial reporting statement check.  
Sarens, De Beelde and Everaert in 2009 stated that an audit committee usually 
lacks data of separate issues, like risk management and financial control. This 
information is lacking because it is issues that the management is responsible of. So, 
as Adel & Maisa states in 2013, this situation create uncertainty for the ability to 
supervise and control role. The importance of internal audit function within a 
company is of paramount importance because it provides useful information to audit 
committee (Bishop, Hermanson, Lapides & Rittenberg, 2000). So, the presence of 
internal audit function supports the audit committee and help to be informed and 
knowledgeable about any possible issues related to finance, internal control and 
auditing procedures. 
According to the S&P500 code the existence of corporate governance mechanisms 
such as audit committee and internal audit department can indeed affect the agency 
theory. Additionally, this S&P500 code demands the presence of internal audit 
department to be appointed by the board and be oversighted by audit committee. 
Furthermore, audit committee should be aware of the views of internal auditors 
separately and at least once yearly without the management presence. 
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With this formation the information asymmetry can be reduced by providing 
internal controls. Consequently, in this thesis, audit committee effectiveness includes 
size and independence.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
 
The size of an audit committee is defined by the number of directors in it. Audit 
committee size is mentioned in different types of codes and regulations, but in our 
case, the majority of companies used in the sample follow the NYSE list of 
requirements. This law requires at least 3 members for its size. The committees 
purpose though is presented as follows: 
1. The committee is responsible of assisting the board of directors to check on 
the financial statement’s integrity. Moreover, the committee is supposed to 
oversight the compliance of the company with the laws and regulations and to 
check the independent auditor’s actual independence. Another factor that it 
should be checked by the audit committee is the performance of the Internal 
Audit department and the auditors’, respectively. 
 
2. Prepare the required disclosure   
 
3. It should take and review the report of the independent auditor, at least once 
in a year and describe: The quality of Internal Audit Function and review the 
audited annual reports of the company. But, not only the annual, also the 
quarterly financial statements of the company should be supervised. The audit 
committee should also check the specific disclosures that the company follows 
with discussions with the managers. 
 
4. Overview and comment on the company’s earnings press releases and also 
the financial condition information. 
 
5. Review the risk assessment and risk management of the company according 
to the appropriate policies. 
 
6. Arrange meetings, periodically and separately, with the management team, 
the auditors, both dependent and independent. 
 
7. Any possible audit problems or difficulties throughout the procedures, should 
be discusses with the audit committee. 
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8. Set and follows specific hiring policies for the company, related to current or 
former employees of the independent auditors. 
 
9. Report directly to the BoD, on a regular basis. 
It is expected from an audit committee to have such a number of members in order 
to handle all the responsibilities effectively. So, if an audit committee can achieve high 
knowledge level, it should be able to act more efficient when monitoring the financial 
reporting procedures. 
For example, if there are enough members in an audit committee of a company, the 
control and monitoring processes of top management activities could be improved 
(Vitten & Lee, 1993). Others believe that if an audit committee is quite large, it involves 
less and loses focus on the material matters, than companies with smaller committee. 
Ghosh et. al (2010) stated that companies with large audit committees are more 
effective than smaller ones, because of the added value in the level of experience of 
each member.  
Prior studies have already tested the association between audit committee size and 
financial reporting quality (Ghosh et. al, 2010) and found that there is a negative 
relationship between audit committee size and earnings management. Other studies 
though, stated that there is no relation at all between the financial reporting quality 
and size. Einchenseher & Shields, 1985 and Menon & Williams, 1994 also found in 
their studies, low relationship between these two components (size and reporting 
quality). 
H1: The size of the audit committee is positively related to financial reporting 
quality 
The independence of an audit committee is considered as the exclusion of current 
and former employees, relatives etc. from management of the company (BRC, 
1999). Through the years many different laws and regulations occurred about 
independence and most companies of the S&P 500 follow the NYSE laws and 
regulations. This list about audit committee independence is outlined that a 
director is non-independent when: 
 
1. The director was working for the company within the last three years or 
currently. Also, when the director is a family member or if a director was an 
executive member the last three years. 
 
2. If between the last three years, the director or one of his family members have 
received over $120,000 in compensation, other than committee fees and 
pension. 
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3. The director is working currently as partner or employee on the listed firm. 
 
4. The director or one of his immediate family member was hired by another 
company as an executive officer, during the last three years or currently and 
simultaneously serves or served on that company’s compensation committee. 
 
5. If the director is currently an employee, or a family member of a company that 
makes transactions to or from the listed company for services. 
A very important rule for the audit committee and its effectiveness is the results 
to be non-manipulated. In order to achieve this, the majority of the companies try to 
have independent members within the committee and generally in the corporate 
governance sector. In the past, there were recorded plenty of incidents were 
members of the company were also in the board or the audit committee and took 
decisions that followed their own interest. As a result, financial statements were 
usually misstated and easily manipulated.  
Thus, audit independence is expected to have a positive association with the 
financial reporting quality. This assumption is made because independent members 
can objectively evaluate internal controls and monitor efficiently check on financial 
statements. This happens because directors are able to provide seperate opinions and 
fulfill their control responsibilities. 
As we can easily understand, audit committee independence is an extremely 
useful tool in order to increase the financial reporting quality of a company. The audit 
committee members can provide better evidence to oversight management. 
Throughout the years, different studies and researches focused on the relationship 
between audit committee independence and a company’s financial reporting quality. 
Likewise, Abbott et al (2004), stated that the audit committee independence is 
negatively related to the incidence of fraud, using a sample of 44 fraudulent and 44 
non-fraudulent US companies. 
On the other hand, Garcia et al. (2012), in a sample of 108 nonfinancial Spanish 
companies, stated that the is no significant relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings management. 
H2: The audit committee independence affects positively the financial reporting 
quality 
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Within the corporate governance process, internal audit function (IAF) consists 
one of the most useful elements according to Gramling & Hermanson, 2009. So, the 
internal audit function is considered by the Institute of Internal Auditors as an activity 
that provides objectiveness, independence and consulting services to improve an 
organizations’ operations. Furthermore, it assists the firm to accomplish its goals by 
using a systematic and disciplined approach to monitor and check the effectiveness of 
risk management and governance processes. 
Goodwin and Kent (2003), support that internal audit function plays an important 
role in corporate governance mechanisms. This importance is based on how effective 
and transparent the management team is (Johansen & Christoffersen, 2017). 
According to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the audit committee must check the 
internal control over the financial reporting. 
Garcia et. al (2012), by examining a sample of 108 nonfinancial Spanish companies, 
stated that there is negative association between internal audit department and 
earnings management. In order to secure the accountability of financial accounts, 
audit committee considered as a mechanism of paramount importance. 
Another study of Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005), in a sample of 434 listed 
Australian firms for the fiscal year of 2000, states that there was no relation between 
earnings management and internal audit function. The establishment of an internal 
audit function was positively related to the level of discretionary accruals.  
 
H3: The existence of an internal audit function is positively related to financial 
reporting quality 
As it is mentioned above, there are many hypotheses and requirements that are 
needed t be followed by the S&P 500 listed companies. We already referred to audit 
committee size, independence and internal audit function. But there are also some 
equally serious hypotheses to take into consideration such as Audit Committee 
financial literacy, Audit Committee meetings frequency and Audit Committee and in-
house Internal Audit. 
Audit committee according to NYSE requirements, must meet at least twice 
annually in order to evaluate and review the quarterly and final audited financial 
statements. Moreover, it is required the audit committee to meet separately, 
periodically with the management and internal and independent auditors to perform 
oversight functions of the company. It is expected that the more frequent the 
meetings the higher the financial reporting quality. The responsibilities of an audit 
committee are to monitor the role of the financial reporting process and to measure 
the effectiveness of the internal audit function.  
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Turner (2011), suggests that audit committee need to act rigorously and ask 
questions related to financial information during the meetings. Another study, 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) states, that companies with serious problems in 
financial reporting quality had audit committees that do not meet frequently enough. 
Abbott et. Al (2004) in a sample of 44 fraud and no-fraud companies, failed to prove 
that audit committee meetings frequency affects fraud.  
The financial expertise of an audit committee is otherwise stated as financial 
literacy of an audit committee. The background of audit committee members is 
considered as an extremely important asset in the effectiveness of the committee. 
According to BRC (1999) audit committee financial literacy is defined as the members’ 
ability to read and understand in depth the financial statements. Now, in NYSE 
requirements about the audit committees it is stated that each member of the audit 
committee should be financial literate. That happens, because audit committees with 
financial literate members are expected to have a higher understanding of financial 
statements and consequently better effectiveness.  For example, a certified public 
accountant member gives the audit committee the expertised knowledge on 
reporting, accounting, taxation and auditing issues.  
Previous studies tested existence of financial  members with knowledge  in audit 
committees (Bedard, Chtourou&Courteau, 2004; Carcello, Hollinsworth, Klein & Neal, 
2006). The results of these studies suggested that if a company has at least one 
financial literate member in its committee, it is less often phainomenon to have an 
aggressive earnings management and fraud. So, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) stated 
that the presence of financial expertise increases the possibility of detecting material 
financial misstatements. The establishment of an internal audit department within the 
company was nor negatively nor positively related to the level of discretionary 
accruals.  
Audit committees usually is very interested in the internal audit function, by 
monitoring and ensuring the efficiency of their activities in risk management controls. 
For example, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 1987 
stated that the internal audit function should have unlimited access to the audit 
committee. Abbott et al. (2004), suggested that the audit committee meetings with 
the in -house internal audit department, should be more frequent. Thus, the audit 
committee will remain always informed and updated about accounting and auditing 
issues of the company. 
The audit committee is expected to be oversighted and monitored by the internal 
audit department, as longs as the goals of the audit department are close enough with 
financial reporting. (Scarbrough et al. 1998). In a survey of selected Canadian chief 
internal auditors, it was stated that committees that are not dependent and had often 
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meetings with internal audit department are more usual to monitor and review the 
results of internal audit studies. 
On the other hand, Garcia et. al (2012) found that the meetings of internal audit 
function and audit committee does not influence earnings management. An effective 
audit committee should have an absolutely healthy association with the internal audit 
function, because together they could fix the entire corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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3. Data & Methodology 
 
In this chapter we will analyze the characteristics of the obtained data to define 
our variables and to explain the sense of the selected methodology in order to define 
the relationship between the audit committee, internal audit function and financial 
reporting quality. Fist of all, we describe the collected data, then we analyze the 
control variables of our model and finally analyze the rest of independent variables. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
In order to test how financial reporting quality is influenced by the presence of 
audit committee and internal audit function, we examine a sample of the S&P 500 
listed companies based on market capitalization from 2013 to 2017. From our sample, 
we had to exclude 113 observations, because some of them were financial firms while 
others were inherent companies or had missing values. So, our final sample is 392 
observations and focuses on several sectors, such as Consumer Discretionary and 
Industrials as it is explained in the following table. 
 
Sector Freq Percentage (%) 
Consumer Discretionary 78 19,89% 
Consumer Goods 4 1,02% 
Consumer Staples 38 9,69% 
Energy 19 4,84% 
Industrials 43 10,96% 
Materials 14 3,57% 
Real Estate 13 3,37% 
Health Care  60 15,3% 
Telecommunication 5 1,27% 
Information Technology 67 17,09% 
Utilities 25 6,37% 
Other 26 6,63% 
Total 392 100% 
 
In the table above, we illustrate the distribution of our sample among sectors. 
We observe that most of the companies examined belong to the Consumer 
Table 1: Sample Analysis 
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Discretionary with 19,89%, Information Technology with 17,09% and Health Care 
15,3%. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Our goal is to identify the effective relevance between audit committee, internal 
audit function and financial reporting quality. Thus, we proceeded by estimating a 
model that can predict how financial reporting quality is improved with the presence 
of audit committee and its characteristics (Size, independence) and internal audit 
function. 
In this thesis, financial reporting quality is measured with accruals, which have 
been used in numerous times in accounting studies before. Early studies used the net 
change in total accruals as a measure while later studies adopted and modified the 
“Jones Model (1991)”.  Thus, discretionary accruals became our accepted proxy for 
extreme managerial discretion. Various accruals measured have been used in the past 
in order to identify the audit quality issue and the earnings management. The 
preceding literature on these studies provide evidence that extreme accruals are less 
desirable.  
Moreover, another type of model to calculate accruals is the “M-SCORE” which is 
presented by Beneish. 
This score is a model that uses eight financial ratios that are calculated by 
coefficients to decide if a firm is profit manipulator. It was created by Professor 
Messod Beneish in June 1999. 
These components are the followed:  
1. Days’ Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI): A big increase in days’ receivables 
may lead to accelerated revenue recognition to inflate profits. 
2. Gross Margin Index (GMI): An impaired gross margin is a negative signal about 
a company’s prospects and gives the opportunity to inflate profits. 
3. Asset Quality Index (AQI): If it is observed an increase in long term assets (e.g. 
Capitalization costs), different from Property, Plant and Equipment indicated 
that the company has potentially increased its involvement in cost deferral to 
inflate profits. 
4. Sales Growth Index (SGI): If a company has high sales growth does not 
necessarily means that the company manipulates earnings. But, quick-growth 
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companies are more likely to commit financial fraud because their financial 
position and capital needs to put pressure on managers. 
5. Depreciation (DEPI): If the level of depreciation is falling and the fixed assets 
increases the possibility that a firm has revised upwards. 
6. Sales, General and Administrative Expenses (SGAI): Many analysts may 
interpret a different increase in SG&A relatively to sales as a negative signal 
about a firm’s prospects, thereby creating an inventive to inflate profits. 
7. Leverage Index (LVGI): Total debt to total assets is leverage. An increase in this 
ratio creates an incentive to manipulate profits in order to meet their liabilities. 
8. Total Accruals to Total Assets (TATA): The change in working capital (other 
than cash) is total accruals. Accruals show the level of discretionary accounting 
choices that managers make. Moreover, if a company have high level of 
accruals, it may indicate with high likelihood of profit manipulation. 
The formula that was used by Messod Beneish in order too calculate accruals 
quality is the following: 
Beneish M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 0.892*SGI + 
0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI + 4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI 
We decided to use the M-Score as happened in previous studies. This score 
states that if a company’s score is higher than -2.22 there is a high probability of 
earnings manipulation. The M-Score states that it could correctly identify 76% of 
manipulators, while identify incorrectly 17,5% of non-manipulators. In a paper that 
published later in 2007, the predictable cost of earnings manipulation used the M-
Score as a stock selection technique from 1993 to 2003. This strategy generated a 
hedged return of nearly 14% per annum. 
 
In 2015, Tajro and Nuru Herawati in a study of the application of Beneish M-
Score Model and Data Mining to detect Financial Fraud, stated that M-Score is one of 
the most effective models to measure accruals quality. On the other hand, 
depreciation, cost of sales or other accounting policies may reduce the ability to detect 
financial fraud. The sample used in the study was 35 fraudulent and 35 non-fraudulent 
companies. Hence, we concluded in using Beneish M-Score model to measure accruals 
quality, as it is the most accurate and effective model. 
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3.3. Analysis of Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Financial Reporting Quality: The dependent variable of our model is Financial 
Reporting Quality. We use the proxy of discretionary accruals in order to measure this 
variable.  
 
Independent Variables:  
 
Audit Committee Size (ACS): This variable is measured by number of audit committee 
members in each company. (Garcia et.al,2012 – Davidson et. Al,2005 – Ghosh et.al, 
2010).  
 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI): This variable is a dummy one and takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has an independent audit committee and 0 if not. (Abbott et.al, 
2004 – Davidson et.al, 2005 – Garcia et.al, 2012) 
 
Internal Audit Function (IAF): Again, this is a variable that is dummy. When a firm has 
an internal audit function it takes the value of 1 and 0 if not. (Davidson et.al, 2005 – 
Garcia et al, 2012) 
 
Control Variables: 
 
   In our dissertation, we try to control all the possible factors that affect financial 
reporting quality. As happened in previous studies, there were positive results for this 
associations.  (Francis, LaFond, Olsson & Schipper, 2004) 
 
Leverage (LEV): Leverage is calculated by total liabilities divided by total assets 
Leverage is used to measure the debt agency costs according to Ruiz Barbadillo et al., 
2007. So usually, the management team could increase the financial costs in order to 
supervise the debt. According to previous studies it is expected that the leverage is 
negatively associated with our dependent variable. Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2010; Al‐
Najjar, 2011; Davidson et al., 2005; Yang & Krishnan, 2005). 
 
 
Loss: Companies sometimes suffer losses for consecutive years and thus have less 
value according to the financial statements (Klein, 2002). This variable takes the value 
1 if the company reported a loss in the current year and prior year, and 0 if not (Al‐
Najjar, 2011; García et al., 2012; Ruiz‐Barbadillo et al., 2007).   
 
Market Capitalization: Matsumoto (2002) states that firms that manage high growth 
ratios are more likely to increase and manage their earnings respectively. This Market 
Capitalization is measured with the market to book value ratio. Sultana, Singh, der 
Zahn, & Mitchell, 2015). 
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Return on Assets: In this thesis, we use the “return on assets” as a variable to control 
financial reporting quality. Return on Assets is a measure of how profitable a company 
is compared to its total assets (Davidson et.al, 2005 – Garcia et.al,2012). 
 
Return on Equity: When we want to measure the financial performance of a firm, we 
use Return on Equity or ROE. It is calculated as a percentage if net income and equity 
are both positive numbers. In this thesis, we use this variable as a control of financial 
reporting quality. 
 
 
 
 
Name of Variable Label Variable Measurement Type 
Financial Reporting Quality DACC Beneish M-Score Dependent 
Audit Committee Size ACS Number of members Independent 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
ACI 0 or 1  Independent 
Internal Audit Function IAF 0 or 1 Independent 
Leverage LEV D/E ratio Control 
Market Capitalization MCAP Market Cap Control 
Loss  LOSS 0 or 1 Control 
Return on Assets ROA ROA ratio Control 
Return on Equity ROE ROE ratio Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Analysis of Variables 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
In our model in order to examine our hypotheses we perform a Linear Regression 
Analysis. So, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to check how much the 
corporate governance mechanisms affect the financial reporting quality. So the 
regression is as follows: 
 
AQ = b1*ACS + b2*ACI +b3*IAF + b4*LEV + b5*MCAP + b6*Loss + 
b7*ROA + b8*ROE + ye + et 
 
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Stats mean min max P50 sd p5 P75 P95 
Aq1 1.44038 .6931472 2.079442 1.386294 .2762 1.098 1.60 1.79 
Aci1 -2.66076 -3.37 -.274 -2.65 .3894 -3.21 -2.52 -2.15 
Acs1 1.44090 .69314 2.0794 1.3862 .2759 1.098 1.60 1.79 
Iaf .909639 0 1 1 .2866 0 1 1 
loss .09795 0 1 0 .29733 0 0 1 
Lev1 -2.3962 -9.210 6.9324 -1.560 2.5799 -5.952 -.0512 .8241 
Roa1 1.8176 -3.506 5.023 1.8840 .8040 .4574 2.318 2.924 
Roe1 2.772 -2.525 8.382 2.8094 .8430 1.477 3.1514 4.057 
Mcap1 4.802 0 5.834 5.120 1.018 2.639 5.545 5.777 
 
From the table above, we can see the descriptive statistics of our model. The table 
reports the descriptive statistics from our 392 firms. The dependent variable Accruals 
Quality (aq1) has a mean 1.44038 for the five consecutive years from 2013 to 2017, 
while standard deviation is .2762 respectively. Moreover, we observe that the 
maximum value is 2.079442 and the median 1.3863. 
 
Our independent variable Internal Audit Function (iaf) presents Mean value of 
.0909639, median of 1 and maximum of 1. Furthermore, standard deviation is .2866 
and is significant at 5% with value of 4. 
 
Our next two independent variables are Audit Committee Size (acs1) and Audit 
committee Independence (aci1).  Audit Committee Size reports a mean value of 
1.44090, median of1.3862, maximum value of 2.0794 and standard deviation of .2759. 
On the other hand, Audit Committee independence shows a mean of -2.66076, 
median of -2.65, maximum of -.274 and standard deviation of .3894. 
 
Moreover, the control variable Return on Assets, we observe that the mean is 
reported as 1.8176, while ROA presents median value of 1.8840 and standard 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
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deviation of .8040. Having a positive value of ROA is an indicator that most of the firms 
used in the sample are receiving more money than investing.  
 
Return on Equity (roe1), which is another control variable of our model, reports a 
mean value of 2.772 within the examined period. The mean of this variable is the most 
stable within the years from all the variables of our regression. The maximum value of 
this variable is 8.382, the standard deviation is .8430.  
 
Loss consists one more control variable of our model and as we can see, the mean 
values is .09705 for the years between 2013 and 2017. The standard deviation values 
for the examined period is .29733. From these results we can safely assume that both 
mean and standard deviation follow the same trend, that is higher in 2013 and drop 
for the rest of the years until 2015. 
 
Market capitalization is one of the most important control variables that affects 
our dependent variable. The minimum value is 0 while the value of standard deviation 
fluctuates between 1.018 and upon within the examined period and as reported 1.018 
The results for this variable show us that there are a lot of changes in values and this 
is represented in the general image of our model. 
 
Finally, the last control variable is Leverage, which in fact is debt/equity ratio. The 
mean values of this variable are -2.3962 which shows that many companies have a 
aggressive loan strategy. The standard deviation of this variable is 2.5799. This result 
shows a quite stable trend the last years. 
 
 
4.2. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 Aq1 iaf loss Aci1 Acs1 Lev1 Roa1 Roe1      Mcap1 
Aq1 1.0000 . . . . . . . . 
iaf -0.0238 1.0000 . . . . . . . 
Loss 0.0125 0.0619*** 1.0000 . . . . . . 
Aci1 -0.0041 -0.074*** -0.0367 1.0000 . . . . . 
Acs1 0.9982*** -0.0251 0.0144 -0.0015 1.000 . . . . 
Lev1 
0.0090 0.1025*** -0.065* -
0.0876*** 
0.0100 1.0000 . . . 
Roa1 
-0.0977 0.0900*** -0.055*** -0.0365 -
0.0973** 
-0.0388 1.0000 . . 
Roe1 -0.0238 0.0612*** -0.064* -0.0218 -0.0230 0.1043 0.4506*** 1.0000 . 
Mcap1 0.0219 0.0233 -0.0859* -0.0991 0.0225 -0.0518 0.1476*** 0.1609*** 1.000 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
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The table above represents the correlation matrices for the variables used in our 
sample, giving significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%.  Correlation results are 
reasonable expected, but we can observe some cross-sectional correlations that could 
potentially be a problem. In order to solve this problem, we treaded our variables to 
avoid collinearity phenomenon.  
 
The correlation coefficient between our main explanatory variables (roa1, acs1) 
are statistically significant at 1% level. Specifically, the correlation coefficient between 
the variables mcap1 and lev1 is -0.0518, while variables acs1 and roe1 have correlation 
coefficient of -0.0230. That means that they have different relations from mcap1 and 
lev1. A possible increase or decrease of one variable will automatically effect on the 
other variable of -0.0230. 
 
Furthermore, the correlations between our dependent and control variables are 
quite interesting. From our control variables, only acs1 has statistically significance 
with our dependent variable, Accruals Quality (aq1), at 5%. There is also a positive 
correlation coefficient between aq1 and mcap1 of 0.0219.  
 
One important notification on our above table, is that most of the variables are 
significant at 5% with each other and less significant at 1% and 10%.  Generally, from 
the correlation matrix we observe that our variables is well fitted with each other and 
our model could lead us to safe results. 
 
4.3. Regression Analysis (OLS) 
 
Evidence presented by descripted statistics and the tables of the correlation matrix 
concerning univariate relations between the variables in not enough. Therefore, we 
try to utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis for more depth results. 
 
Source SS df MS 
Model 
Residual 
128.525422 8 16.0656777 
.44088306 1702   .000259038 
Total 128.966305 1710 .075418892 
 
 
Number of obs 
=  
1711 
Number of Var 9 
F ( 8, 292 ) = 62020.49 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R- squared =  0.9966 
Adj R- squared 
= 
0.9966 
Root MSE = .01609 
aq1 coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
iaf -.000379 .001352    -0.28            0.779             -.0030306             .0022727 
loss -.0028551 .0014289 -2.00 0.046 -.0056577 -.000052 
Table 5: OLS Regression 
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The results of the regression analysis help to eliminate the gap of the association 
between internal audit function, audit committee and financial reporting quality, that 
is reported at the descriptive statistics and correlation. Most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1%, when it comes to the suitable variable. As it is observed 
there is also some insignificant variables, but these ones are close to zero even at the 
level of 10%.  
 
The explanatory power of our model is overall very likeable with a value of R2= 
99.66%. At this point we could analyze our dissertation’s main dependent variable; 
Accruals Quality statistical significance is at a level that could lead us to safe results.  
 
Based on the findings above, the total coefficient of our variables is -.0020728 and 
the standard error of all the variables is .0041541. The link between these variables is 
a clear indication of possible financial statements manipulation. 
 
About the correlation of the accrual’s quality and the internal audit function, we 
have coefficient of -.000379. This value is below zero and means that there is no 
significant relationship between these two variables. 
 
However, the high R² is an indicator that our model fit well in the observations. 
Also, that consist that our independent variables are influenced from our control 
variables at a high level. Based on our result variables with higher R² indicate that the 
model used is more accurate. Also, the year effect command indicates that there is a 
year to year coefficient that is strongly balanced, and we have year effect on our 
model. 
 
Generally, from our results we can assume that the model is quite accurate and 
give us a safe result on our hypothesis. However, the hypotheses about audit 
committee independence and internal audit function are rejected as we observe p 
values bigger that 0.01 (0.799, 0.089 respectively). On the other hand, Audit 
Committee Size hypothesis cannot be rejected as we see a p-value of 0.000, meaning 
that is highly significant with Financial Reporting Quality. Our findings above, state 
that our selected variables are well fitted with the observations despite the big sample 
size and that indeed the Audit Committee Size affects the Financial Reporting Quality. 
Moreover, we can safely assume that there is need for further investigation in the 
future using other proxies of corporate governance mechanisms. 
Aci1 -.0016957 .0009955 -1.70 0.089 -.0036432 .0002567 
Acs1 .9990335 .0014308 698.24 0.000 .99622272 1.00184 
Lev1 -.0000597 .0001543 -0.39 0.699 -.0003624 .000243 
roa1 -.0001772 .0005596 -0.32 0.752 -.0012748 .0009204 
roe1 -.000222 .0005244 -0.42 0.672 -.0012504 .0008065 
mcap1 -.0000237 .0003971 -0.06 0.952 -.0008025 .0007551 
_cons -.0020728 .0041541 -0.50 0.618 -.0102206 .0060749 
Year 
Effect  
Included 
(strongly 
balanced) 
Included 
(strongly 
balanced 
Included 
(strongly 
balanced 
Included 
(strongly 
balanced 
Included 
(strongly 
balanced 
Included 
(strongly 
balanced 
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4.4. OLS Robust Regression 
 
Now we present the OLS Robust Regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover we decided to run a robust error test for our OLS regression in order to 
take more accurate results. As we observe in the table above, there are changes 
mostly in the Standard Error results. Furthermore, we observe that the P value of Audit 
Committee Size (acs1) is the most significant value in accordance with our dependent 
variable. Another variable that has value almost 0.05 is Aci1 and Roe1 .  
The Loss variable reports a Pvalue of 0.355. This means, that after running the 
robust OLS regression, we observe that if a company reports losses the last five years, 
there is not much evidence for financial misstatements. But the most significant result 
of our model is that the Audit Committee Size affects a lot the Accruals Quality and 
furthermore the better financial reporting Quality.  
We observe, that in a model of 1711 observations there is a P value of 0.0000, 
meaning that we used variables that affect one another and all together the 
dependent variable. So there is evidence that our control variables affect constantly 
the dependet one. 
To summarize, all the finding above, leads us to the conclusion that although the 
variables are well fitted with each other, some hypotheses needs more extend 
research, and deeper that descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and regression 
analysis. This thesis gives an opportunity for further investigation on the matter 
Number of obs =  1711 
F ( 8, 292 ) = . 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R- squared =  0.9966 
Root MSE = .01609 
Aq1 coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
iaf -.000379 .0004195  -0.90          0.366            -.0012017                .0004438 
loss -.0028851 .0029589 -0.96 0.355 -.0086586 .0029484 
Aci1 -.0016958 .00189 -1.43 0.154 -.0040279 .0006363 
Acs1 .9990355 .0018143 550.64 0.000 .9954749 1.002592 
Lev1 -.0000597 .0001089 -0.55 0.584 -.002733 .0001539 
Roa1 -.0001772 .0004119 -0.43 0.667 -.0009852 .0006308 
Roe1 -.000222 .0002162 -1.03 0.305 -.00646 .000202 
Mcap1 -.0000237 .002805 -0.08 0.933 -.0005738        .0005264 
_cons -.0020728 .0039896 -0.52 0.603 -.0098978 .0057522 
Table 6: Robust OLS Regression 
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4.5.  Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
On the diagram below, we present the Heteroskedasticity test. As we observe we have 
homoskedasticity in our sample variables, so we can not reject the null hypothesis of 
constant variable. This diagram helps understanding that our model is effective and 
accurate. 
 
 
 
 
4.6.  Skewness – Kurtosis Test  
 
Table 7: Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(kurtosis) Chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Aq1 2.0e+03 0.0077 0.0000 209.10 0.0000 
iaf 2.0e+03 0.0000 0.0000 1113.12 0.0000 
Loss 2.0e+03 0.0000 0.0000 1040.82 0.0000 
Aci1 2.0e+03 0.0000 0.0000 1191.53 0.0000 
Acs1 2.0e+03 0.0050 0.0000 223.26 0.0000 
Lev1 1.8e+03 0.6191 0.0000 1765.65 0.0000 
Roa1 1.9e+03 0.0000 0.0000 548.65 0.0000 
Roe1 1.8e+03 0.0000 0.0000 272.31 0.0000 
Mcap1 2.0e+03 0.0000 0.0000 569.60 0.0000 
Diagram 1: Heteroscedasticity Test 
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In the table above, we can see the table of our skewness and kurtosis test on our 
model. Skewness is a type o measurement of the probability distribution of some 
random variables with its mean. So, skewness informs as about the amount way of 
skew (how far from horizontal asymmetry). This value can be either positive or 
negative or unidentified. If tis value is zero, the data are in absolute symmetry 
although it is not very accurate for real world data. 
 
In our case we observe that the most of variables’ skewness is 0.000, so perfectly 
symmetrical. Only leverage (lev1) and Audit Committee Size (acs1) report skewness 
different from 0.000 but with little differences.  About Kurtosis, we observe that all 
the variables report values of 0.000 which means that we have a normally distributed 
model. So generally, from this test we can safely assume that we have a perfectly 
suited model to run and have accurate results. 
 
4.7.  Normality Test 
 
 
 
As we see from the statement above, we have a perfectly normal distribution in 
our model. According to Doornik-Hansen test, if the P-Value is less than 0.005 means 
that we have normality in our model.  
 
 
4.8. Fixed Effects Test 
  
In the table below is reported the results of the Fixed Effects Test that we run in 
our model. With this way we tried to interpret if there are fixed effect within the OLS 
regression of our model. The results show that within, between and overall in our 
model there are fixed effects and there is no need to further test for random effects. 
We observe that in a total observation 1711, we have a P-Value of 0.0000 meaning 
that the model is accurate. 
 
    Doornik-Hansen                  chi2(18) =46726.978   Prob>chi2 =  0.0000
Test for multivariate normality
. mvtest normality aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1
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Table 8:  Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(374, 1329) =     1.41           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .96068211   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01540694
     sigma_u    .07615722
                                                                              
       _cons      .393193   .0323887    12.14   0.000     .3296545    .4567315
       mcap1            0  (omitted)
        roe1    -.0001449   .0007454    -0.19   0.846    -.0016072    .0013173
        roa1     .0000852   .0008704     0.10   0.922    -.0016223    .0017927
        lev1     .0002469   .0002355     1.05   0.295    -.0002152     .000709
        loss    -.0059058   .0023612    -2.50   0.012    -.0105379   -.0012737
         iaf    -.0020502   .0018334    -1.12   0.264    -.0056469    .0015465
        acs1     .7262583   .0223509    32.49   0.000     .6824114    .7701052
        aci1    -.0016747   .0011167    -1.50   0.134    -.0038653    .0005159
                                                                              
         aq1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.9932                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,1329)          =    152.69
       overall = 0.9965                                        max =         5
       between = 0.9993                                        avg =       4.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.4458                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: company1                        Number of groups   =       375
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1711
note: mcap1 omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg aq1 aci1 acs1 iaf loss lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, fe
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5. CONCLUSIONS & FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
 
Nowadays, the audit committee and internal audit function are considered very 
crucial corporate governance mechanisms, after the huge economic scandals of the 
last decade. This thesis aims to the examination of the effect of Audit Committees and 
Internal Audit Function on Financial Reporting Quality. With a sample of 392 non-
financial firms listed on S&P 500 between 2013 and 2017, the findings show that Audit 
Committee Size and the existence of Internal Audit affect the Financial Reporting 
Quality, measured by accruals. Hence, we understand that when the audit committee 
members are more than three means that it is less likely to deal with earnings 
manipulation.  On the other hand, our findings show that companies that have 
dependent members on the Audit Committee or even family members, it is more 
usual to deal with manipulation because of personal interest.  
 
Moreover, the Internal Audit department is a very crucial corporate governance 
mechanism if a company wants to improve the quality of Financial Reporting Quality. 
This happens by oversighting all the necessary risks, assessing internal controls and 
finding earnings manipulation. Consequently, the internal auditor, runs all the 
appropriate tests and evaluates the financial statements. Hence, the information 
asymmetry is reduced with the presence of internal audit function within a company. 
The internal audit department assists the committee to be aware about any financial 
misstatements. However, the findings of our model suggest that there is significant 
relationship between Audit Committee Independence, or the others independent 
variables such as ROE, ROA, Loss, Market Cap etc. On the other hand, the only variable 
that shows significant relationship with Accruals Quality is Audit Committee Size. So, 
Financial Reporting Quality is affected by Audit Committee Size in S&P500 non-
financial listed companies.  
 
This thesis concentrates on some attributes of corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as Audit Committee and Internal Audit Function effectiveness on Financial 
Reporting Quality. Firms may think that the existence of an Internal Audit Function is 
a crucial mechanism that influences the annual report. The S&P500 listed companies 
should focus on the input and output of Audit Committee results and the major issues 
related to Financial Reporting Quality.   
 
The main investors of our sample-companies will benefit from a better organized 
corporate governance mechanism and especially Audit Committee. With this way, 
companies will attract more foreign investments and restore the confidence of the 
market. 
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This thesis has also a few limitations. First, some of the data about audit 
committee size and independence was not easy to find because of its considered 
confidential. The effectiveness of Audit Committees is measured by a few variables 
included in S&P500 code, without thinking other variables. Finally, we excluded 
financial firms from our sample because of a different format that they follow for 
financial statements. 
 
The question analyzed by this thesis, is open to further investigation the next 
years. We could not reach to safe results from our sample and findings. From our 
model, we conclude that the only variable that affects our dependent one is Audit 
Committee Independence. However, there is not significant relationship with all the 
other variables. That means that although the variables fit well with each other, we 
faced some problems with our results. 
 
Prior studies also concluded to same results and stated that there is no significant 
relationship with financial reporting Quality. So, this dissertation leaves a blank space 
for further investigation on other corporate governance mechanisms that may affect 
the Financial Reporting Quality of a company.  
 
Although this dissertation contributes to the existing literature by documenting 
the impact of some corporate governance mechanism such as Audit Committee and 
Internal Audit Function to the Financial Reporting Quality. The difference with the 
prior literature, is that we analyzed a big sample of the S&P500 non-financial listed 
companies with 1711 observations.  
 
Generally, from our findings we can safely assume that we chosen variables that 
are well fitted with the observations. However, only the Audit Committee Size seems 
to have significant relationship with our dependent variable, Financial Reporting 
Quality. The other variables are not highly significant with the dependent variable but 
that does not affect our results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
6. REFFERENCES 
 
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2004). Audit committee characteristics and 
restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(1), 69–87. 
 
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2010). Serving two masters: The association 
between audit committee internal audit oversight and internal audit activities. 
Accounting Horizons, 24(1), 1–24. 
 
Abernathy, J. L., Barnes, M., Stefaniak, C., & Weisbarth, A. (2017). An international 
perspective on audit report lag: A synthesis of the literature and opportunities for 
future research. International Journal of Auditing, 21(1), 100–127. 
 
Al‐Najjar, B. (2011). The determinants of audit committee independence and 
activity: Evidence from the UK. International Journal of Auditing, 15(2), 191–203. 
 
Audit Analytics Database: https://www.auditanalytics.com/  
 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2014). Corporate governance principles and 
recommendations. Sydney: ASX Corporate Governance Council. 
 
Baatwah, S. R., Salleh, Z., & Ahmad, N. (2015). CEO characteristics and audit report 
timeliness: Do CEO tenure and financial expertise matter? Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 30(8–9), 998–1022. 
 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of 
director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review, 71(4), 443–
465. 
 
Bédard, J., Chtourou, S. M., & Courteau, L. (2004). The effect of audit committee 
expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), 13–35. 
 
Bishop, W. G., Hermanson, D. R., Lapides, P. D., & Rittenberg, L. E. (2000). The year 
of the audit committee. Internal Auditor, 57(2), 46–51. 
 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999). Report and recommendations of the Blue-Ribbon 
Committee on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. Stamford, 
CT: BRC. 
 
Braiotta, L. (2000). The audit committee handbook (second ed.). New York, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Carcello, J. V., Hollingsworth, C. W., Klein, A., & Neal, T. L. (2006). Audit committee 
financial expertise, competing corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings 
management.  
 
35 
 
Chahine, S., & Safiedinne, A. (2011). Is corporate governance different for the 
Lebanese banking system? Journal of Management & Governance, 15, 207–226. 
 
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 51(3), 371–406. 
 
Davidson, R. A., Goodwin‐Stewart, J., & Kent, P. (2005). Internal governance 
structures and earnings management. Accounting and Finance, 45, 241–267. 
 
Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role 
of accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review, 77(s‐1), 35–59. 
 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of 
earnings manipulation: An analysis of firm’s subject to enforcement actions by the 
SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36. 
 
DeZoort, F. T. (1998). An analysis of experience effects on audit committee 
members' oversight judgments. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 23(1), 1–21. 
 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., Archambeault, D. S., & Reed, S. A. (2002). Audit 
committee effectiveness: A synthesis of the empirical audit committee literature. 
Journal of Accounting Literature, 21, 38–75. 
 
DeZoort, F. T., Hermanson, D. R., & Houston, R. W. (2003). Audit committee support 
for auditors: The effects of materiality justification and accounting precision. Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, 22(3), 175–199. 
 
DeZoort, F. T., & Salterio, S. E. (2001). The effects of corporate governance 
experience and financial‐reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee 
members' judgments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice &Theory, 20(2), 31–47. 
 
Dhaliwal, D. A. N., Naiker, V. I. C., & Navissi, F. (2010). The association between 
accruals quality and the characteristics of accounting experts and mix of expertise on 
audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), 787–827. 
 
Doyle, J. T., Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2007). Accruals quality and internal control 
over financial reporting. The Accounting Review, 82(5), 1141–1170. 
 
Dry, E. K. (2003). Corporate governance in the Sultanate of Oman. 
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business, 3(1), 45–82. 
 
Einchenseher, J. W., & Shields, D. (1985). Corporate director liability and monitoring 
preferences. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 4(1), 13–31. 
 
European Commission https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting 
entrepreneurship/we-work-for/family-business_pl   
36 
 
 EuroZone https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone  
 
Farber, D. (2005). Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance 
matter? Accounting Review, 80(2), 539–561. 
 
Francis, J., Huang, A. H., Rajgopal, S., & Zang, A. Y. (2008). CEO reputation and 
earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(1), 109–147. 
 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2004). Costs of equity and earnings 
attributes. Accounting Review, 79(4), 967–1010. 
 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005). The market pricing 
of accruals quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(2), 295–327. 
 
García, L. S., Barbadillo, E. R., & Pérez, M. O. (2012). Audit committee and internal 
audit and the quality of earnings: empirical evidence from Spanish companies. 
Journal of Management & Governance, 16(2), 305–331 
 
Ghosh, A., Marra, A., & Moon, D. (2010). Corporate boards, audit committees, and 
earnings management: Pre‐ and post‐SOX evidence. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 37(9–10), 1145–1176. 
 
Goodwin, J., & Kent, P. (2003). Factors affecting the voluntary use of internal audit. 
Working paper, University of Queensland, St Lucia/Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane. 
 
Gurufocus Website: https://www.gurufocus.com/  
 
Gramling, A., & Hermanson, D. (2009). Assisting the audit committee during 
the financial crisis. Corporate Governance and Internal Auditing, 24(3), 41–44. 
 
Gujarati, D., & Porter, D. (2009). Basic econometrics (5th ed.). New York, NY: 
McGraw‐Hill. 
 
Hasan, A., & Butt, S. A. (2009). Impact of ownership structure and corporate 
governance on capital structure of Pakistani listed companies. 
 
HassabElnaby, H. R., Said, A., & Wolfe, G. (2007). Audit committees oversight 
responsibilities post Sarbanes–Oxley Act. American Journal of Business, 22(2), 19–32. 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern Industrial Revolution, exit, and the failure 
of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, 48, 831–880. 
 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, 
agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360. 
 
37 
 
Johansen, T. R., & Christoffersen, J. (2017). Performance evaluations in audit firms: 
Evaluation foci and dysfunctional behaviour. International Journal of Auditing, 21, 
24–37. 
 
Kalbers, L. P. (1992). Audit committees and internal auditors. Internal Auditor, 49(6), 
37–44. 
 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 375–400. 
 
Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit committee quality and internal control: An empirical 
analysis. Accounting Review, 80(2), 649–675. 
 
Krishnan, J., Wen, Y., & Zhao, W. (2011). Legal expertise on corporate audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. The Accounting Review, 86(6), 2099–
2130. 
 
Lin, J. W., & Hwang, M. I. (2010). Audit quality, corporate governance, and earnings 
management: A meta‐analysis. International Journal of Auditing, 14(1), 57–77. 
 
Matsumoto, D. (2002). Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings 
surprises. The Accounting Review, 77, 483–514. 
 
McHugh, J., & Raghunandan, K. (1994). Internal auditors' independence and 
interactions with audit committees: Challenges of form and substance. Advances in 
Accounting, 12, 313–333. 
 
McMullen, D. A., & Raghunandan, K. (1996). Enhancing audit committee 
effectiveness. Journal of Accountancy, 182(2), 79–81 
 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987). Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Washington, DC: The 
Commission. 
 
Sarens, G., De Beelde, I. D., & Everaert, P. (2009). Internal audit: A comfort provider 
to the audit committee. The British Accounting Review, 41(2), 90–106. 
 
Scarbrough, D. P., Rama, D. V., & Raghunandan, K. R. (1998). Audit committee 
composition and interaction with internal auditing: Canadian evidence. Accounting 
Horizons, 12(1), 51–62. 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. 
Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461–488. 
 
Vinten, G., & Lee, C. (1993). Audit committee and corporate control. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 8(3), 113–142. 
 
38 
 
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting 
choices, and informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 
61–92. 
 
Yang, J. S., & Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit committees and quarterly earnings 
management. International Journal of Auditing, 9, 201–219. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
7. APPENDIX 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Year Effect 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                delta:  1 year
        time variable:  year, 2013 to 2017
       panel variable:  company1 (strongly balanced)
. xtset company1 year, yearly
     p75          19         9         1       256       229       186       173        10         5
     p50          16         9         1     167.5     153.5     120.5     118.5         7         5
      p5           1         4         1        14        18        15        13         2         5
      sd    6.549238  2.033411  5.306187  100.1408  84.47483  67.94357  66.95597  3.880405   .280634
     max          24         9        21       342       290       244       243        14         6
     p50          16         9         1     167.5     153.5     120.5     118.5         7         5
     min           1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1         1
    mean    14.99235  7.971939  3.209184  169.1582  154.7456  124.9538  120.0671      7.25  4.977041
                                                                                                    
   stats         GAQ      GIAF     GLOSS     GMCAP      GLEV      GROA      GROE      GACS      GACI
40 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
       mcap1     0.1609*  1.0000 
        roe1     1.0000 
                                
                   roe1    mcap1
       mcap1     0.0219   0.0233  -0.0859* -0.0091   0.0225  -0.0518*  0.1476*
        roe1    -0.0238   0.0612* -0.0641* -0.0218  -0.0230   0.1043*  0.4506*
        roa1    -0.0977*  0.0900* -0.0550* -0.0365  -0.0973* -0.0388   1.0000 
        lev1     0.0090   0.1025* -0.0658* -0.0876*  0.0100   1.0000 
        acs1     0.9982* -0.0251   0.0144  -0.0015   1.0000 
        aci1    -0.0041  -0.0747* -0.0367   1.0000 
        loss     0.0125   0.0619*  1.0000 
         iaf    -0.0238   1.0000 
         aq1     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    aq1      iaf     loss     aci1     acs1     lev1     roa1
. pwcorr aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, star(0.05)
       mcap1     0.1609*  1.0000 
        roe1     1.0000 
                                
                   roe1    mcap1
       mcap1     0.0219   0.0233  -0.0859* -0.0091   0.0225  -0.0518*  0.1476*
        roe1    -0.0238   0.0612* -0.0641* -0.0218  -0.0230   0.1043*  0.4506*
        roa1    -0.0977*  0.0900* -0.0550* -0.0365  -0.0973* -0.0388   1.0000 
        lev1     0.0090   0.1025* -0.0658* -0.0876*  0.0100   1.0000 
        acs1     0.9982* -0.0251   0.0144  -0.0015   1.0000 
        aci1    -0.0041  -0.0747* -0.0367   1.0000 
        loss     0.0125   0.0619*  1.0000 
         iaf    -0.0238   1.0000 
         aq1     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    aq1      iaf     loss     aci1     acs1     lev1     roa1
. pwcorr aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, star(0.1)
       mcap1     0.1609*  1.0000 
        roe1     1.0000 
                                
                   roe1    mcap1
       mcap1     0.0219   0.0233  -0.0859* -0.0091   0.0225  -0.0518   0.1476*
        roe1    -0.0238   0.0612* -0.0641* -0.0218  -0.0230   0.1043*  0.4506*
        roa1    -0.0977*  0.0900* -0.0550  -0.0365  -0.0973* -0.0388   1.0000 
        lev1     0.0090   0.1025* -0.0658* -0.0876*  0.0100   1.0000 
        acs1     0.9982* -0.0251   0.0144  -0.0015   1.0000 
        aci1    -0.0041  -0.0747* -0.0367   1.0000 
        loss     0.0125   0.0619*  1.0000 
         iaf    -0.0238   1.0000 
         aq1     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    aq1      iaf     loss     aci1     acs1     lev1     roa1
. pwcorr aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, star(0.01)
41 
 
Regression OLS 
 
 
 
Regression OLS Robust 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0020728   .0041541    -0.50   0.618    -.0102206    .0060749
       mcap1    -.0000237   .0003971    -0.06   0.952    -.0008025    .0007551
        roe1     -.000222   .0005244    -0.42   0.672    -.0012504    .0008065
        roa1    -.0001772   .0005596    -0.32   0.752    -.0012748    .0009204
        lev1    -.0000597   .0001543    -0.39   0.699    -.0003624     .000243
        acs1     .9990335   .0014308   698.24   0.000     .9962272     1.00184
        aci1    -.0016958   .0009955    -1.70   0.089    -.0036482    .0002567
        loss    -.0028551   .0014289    -2.00   0.046    -.0056577   -.0000525
         iaf     -.000379    .001352    -0.28   0.779    -.0030306    .0022727
                                                                              
         aq1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    128.966305  1710  .075418892           Root MSE      =  .01609
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9966
    Residual     .44088306  1702  .000259038           R-squared     =  0.9966
       Model    128.525422     8  16.0656777           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1702) =62020.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1711
. regress aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0020728   .0039896    -0.52   0.603    -.0098978    .0057522
       mcap1    -.0000237   .0002805    -0.08   0.933    -.0005738    .0005264
        roe1     -.000222   .0002162    -1.03   0.305     -.000646     .000202
        roa1    -.0001772   .0004119    -0.43   0.667    -.0009852    .0006308
        lev1    -.0000597   .0001089    -0.55   0.584    -.0002733    .0001539
        acs1     .9990335   .0018143   550.64   0.000     .9954749    1.002592
        aci1    -.0016958    .001189    -1.43   0.154    -.0040279    .0006363
        loss    -.0028551   .0029589    -0.96   0.335    -.0086586    .0029484
         iaf     -.000379   .0004195    -0.90   0.366    -.0012017    .0004438
                                                                              
         aq1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .01609
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9966
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1702) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1711
. regress aq1 iaf loss aci1 acs1 lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, vce(robust)
42 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(374, 1329) =     1.41           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .96068211   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .01540694
     sigma_u    .07615722
                                                                              
       _cons      .393193   .0323887    12.14   0.000     .3296545    .4567315
       mcap1            0  (omitted)
        roe1    -.0001449   .0007454    -0.19   0.846    -.0016072    .0013173
        roa1     .0000852   .0008704     0.10   0.922    -.0016223    .0017927
        lev1     .0002469   .0002355     1.05   0.295    -.0002152     .000709
        loss    -.0059058   .0023612    -2.50   0.012    -.0105379   -.0012737
         iaf    -.0020502   .0018334    -1.12   0.264    -.0056469    .0015465
        acs1     .7262583   .0223509    32.49   0.000     .6824114    .7701052
        aci1    -.0016747   .0011167    -1.50   0.134    -.0038653    .0005159
                                                                              
         aq1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.9932                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(7,1329)          =    152.69
       overall = 0.9965                                        max =         5
       between = 0.9993                                        avg =       4.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.4458                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: company1                        Number of groups   =       375
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1711
note: mcap1 omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg aq1 aci1 acs1 iaf loss lev1 roa1 roe1 mcap1, fe
